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Abstract 
 
This study is the first to measure the impact of federal regulations on consumer prices. By 
combining consumer expenditure and pricing data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, industry 
supply-chain data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and industry-specific regulation 
information from the Mercatus CenterÕs RegData database, we determine that regulations 
promote higher consumer prices, and that these price increases have a disproportionately 
negative effect on low-income households. Specifically, we find that the poorest households 
spend larger proportions of their incomes on heavily regulated goods and services prone to sharp 
price increases. While the literature explores other specific costs of regulation, noting that higher 
consumer prices are a probable consequence of heavy regulation, this study is the first to provide 
a thorough empirical analysis of that relationship across industries. Irrespective of the reasons for 
imposing new regulations, these results demonstrate that in the aggregate, the negative 
consequences are significant, especially for the most vulnerable households. 
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1. Introduction 
The 2012 Code of Federal Regulations includes more than a million individual restrictions, 
representing a regulatory burden that has grown by more than 28% over the past 15 years (Al-
Ubaydli and McLaughlin 2015). Certain industries have experienced even faster regulatory 
growth over the same time period. For example, federal regulations related to highway and street 
construction increased by 94% over the past decade and a half. The natural gas distribution 
industry experienced a 109% rise in regulations, and the corresponding increase in the water and 
sewage industry was 125%.1 As such, there is substantial variation in the types of regulations 
that exist both across and within industriesÑas well as across numerous regulatory agencies. 
While these regulations differ in their stated purposes and structures, they have consequences for 
both consumers and firms. The central question of this paper, which has been widely neglected 
by the literature, is how does greater regulatory intervention impact consumer prices and do 
those price changes affect socioeconomic groups differently? 
 Until 1971, most economists assumed that regulations were introduced with benevolent 
intentions to correct various market failures (i.e., concentrations of market power, externalities or 
asymmetric information). This public interest view of regulation was upended by StiglerÕs 
(1971) interest group theory of government, which postulates that competing interest groups 
(e.g., consumers and producers) pressure government regulators to craft rules that benefit them. 
Echoing the ideas of Olson (1965), Stigler (1971) predicts that smaller and better organized 
groups with much to gain will prevail over larger groups comprised of members with diffuse and 
less salient interests in the regulatory process. As such, industry frequently is the main 
                                                
1 All estimates of the regulatory burden are from the RegData database of the Mercatus Center at George Mason 
University (North American Industry Classification System [NAICS] 2212Ñnatural gas, NAICS 2213Ñwater 
sewage, and NAICS 2373Ñhighway and street construction). 
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beneficiary of new regulations. Building on this framework, Peltzman (1976) introduces the 
concept of self-interested regulators. Rather than simply being swayed by competing interest 
groups, regulators seek to maximize political payoffs (e.g., campaign contributions, expanded 
power/influence, and so on) in exchange for crafting rules favorable to the prevailing group. 
These rules can take the form of traditional economic regulation (such as price controls and 
barriers to entry/exit) or social regulation (e.g., occupational safety, consumer protection, 
environmental quality). Regardless of the form of regulation or the motivation driving regulators 
to promulgate new restrictions, one cannot deny that compliance with regulations translates into 
higher costs for would-be entrants and/or incumbent businesses, which ultimately increases 
prices for consumers. In fact, McKenzie and Macaulay (1980) argue that many regulations are 
intentionally wasteful and benefit neither firms nor consumers, but are instead designed to inflate 
the costs of producing private goods, while simultaneously reducing the relative prices of public 
goods, thereby stimulating the demand for them. Ultimately, the fulfillment of these demands 
expands the size of the government and the scope of its activity in the economy. The core 
hypothesis of this paper is that if this rise in prices occurs, regulatory growth is unlikely to affect 
all consumers equally. Because the spending patterns of high- and low-income families differ, 
regulations that increase prices in a particular market sector often have disparate socioeconomic 
impacts. 
Recent information from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) reveals that households 
just below the poverty line spend substantially larger percentages of their incomes on 
transportation and gasoline, utilities, food, and healthcare than do high-income households 
(Goldstein and Vo 2012). To the extent that regulations raise prices, regulations will cause 
regressive effects if they are concentrated in the economic sectors where low-income households 
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spend the most. The purpose of this study is to analyze the potential regressive effects of federal 
regulationsÑfirst by documenting differences in consumer spending patterns across income 
levels and then by examining how regulatory growth has affected the prices of goods and 
services for consumers across the income distribution spectrum. 
By using detailed expenditure and pricing data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), we first assess whether meaningful differences can be observed in the spending habits of 
average consumers from different income quintiles. We join these data with information on 
regulatory restrictions by industry, available from the RegData database published by the 
Mercatus Center at George Mason University, to determine the effect of regulatory expansion on 
consumer prices. Our results are twofold. First, growth in federal regulations is associated with 
higher consumer prices overall. Specifically, a 10% increase in total regulations leads to just 
under a 1% (0.890%) increase in consumer prices. Second, we find that households from the 
poorest income groups experience the highest overall increases in the prices they pay. 
2. Background on the costs of federal regulations 
Measuring the full costs of federal regulations is difficult. The Regulatory Right-to-Know Act of 
1999 requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to publish an annual report 
detailing the costs and benefits of major federal regulations. In its May 2014 report, OMB 
estimates the annual cost of regulations to be between $74 billion and $110 billion.2 However, 
OMB openly acknowledges that this estimate is far from a full accounting of all federal 
regulatory costs. For example, the report excludes costs associated with rules that are more than 
                                                
2 This cost estimate is in constant 2014 dollars, as evaluated by Crain and Crain (2014). The actual estimate cited in 
OMB (2014) is $68.5 billion to $101.8 billion, in 2010 dollars. 
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10 years old and rules that are not defined as major (i.e., rules having an annual economic effect 
of less than $100 million). 
Crain and Crain (2014) estimate that the true comprehensive cost is more than $2 
trillion,3 including all regulations and accounting for many indirect costs, such as reduced 
economic productivity, that are absent from OMBÕs analysis. The authors note that some portion 
of these costs is passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, although they neither model 
nor empirically estimate the price increases. 
Several papers address the potentially harmful unintended consequences of regulations. 
McLaughlin and Williams (2014) outline some of the adverse outcomes related to regulatory 
accumulation, or the ÒbuildupÓ of old or obsolete regulations inherent in the US regulatory 
system, including slower rates of economic growth, reductions in new business formation, and 
weaker international competitiveness. A substantial literature exists documenting the adverse 
consequences of regulation in both the United States and abroad. 
For example, Dawson and Seater (2013) examine the specific impact of federal 
regulations on economic growth and estimate that since 1949, regulatory intervention has 
significantly reduced the rate of economic growth, resulting in an accumulated GDP loss of 
$38.8 trillion by 2011. Other papers report a negative relationship between regulatory expansion 
and economic productivity, including Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), Djankov, McLiesh and 
Ramalho (2006) and Crafts (2006). G¿rgens, Paldam and Wrtz (2003) explore the possibility of 
a nonlinear relationship between regulation and economic growth and find that the bulk of the 
effect stems from a transition from moderate to heavy levels of regulation. 
                                                
3 This estimate is in 2014 dollars. 
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One key channel through which federal regulations are likely to affect economic growth 
is by creating significant barriers to new business entry. Benson (2004) discusses this barrier as a 
significant opportunity cost of regulation. Empirical studies find that higher regulatory 
compliance costs lead to slower rates of new business entry in both Europe (Klapper, Laeven and 
Rajan 2006) and the United States (Fisman and Sarria-Allende 2004). Ciccone and Papaioannou 
(2007) examine the time it takes new businesses to comply with regulatory entry requirements 
and find that reducing red tape is associated with larger numbers of start-ups.4 
Social regulation, which includes a wide array of non-economic regulations (e.g., 
consumer protection rules, workplace safety regulations, environmental rules) is a significant 
source of federal regulatory restrictions.5 Third-party advocacy groups often play pivotal roles in 
the passage of new social regulations. The pioneering work of Yandle (1983) keenly 
demonstrates that coalitions of groups with aligned goals (Òbootleggers and BaptistsÓ) may work 
together to promulgate new regulations. Dolar and Shughart (2007) apply this concept to 
financial services, and chronical how anti-Wall Street groups (Òthe BaptistsÓ) and large banks 
(Òthe bootleggersÓ) jointly supported strict measures ostensibly designed to curb money 
laundering and the movement of funds to finance terrorists. The resulting high compliance costs 
reduced competition for the big banks as many smaller banks struggled to comply. Interestingly, 
Paul and Schoening (1991) demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that the participation 
of interested third parties seeking monetary payoffs (unlike Òthe BaptistsÓ described above), 
leads to increases the prices of regulated products. It is worth noting that although third-party 
advocacy groups can successfully lobby for new restrictions on business, this form of regulation 
                                                
4 For other examples detailing the relationship between regulation and economic growth, see Ardagna and Lusardi 
(2010) and Benson (2015). 
5 For a breakdown of federal regulations by type, see the Mercatus CenterÕs ÒHow the Top Ten Regulators of 2012 
Changed over Ten YearsÓ (http://regdata.org/how-the-top-ten-regulators-of-2012-changed-over-ten-years/). 
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can also result from industry capture, whereby a subset of firms within an industry supports more 
stringent standards because they (and not their competitors) have cost advantages in compliance 
(see, for example, Shughart 2003 and Hoffer et al. 2015).6 
Focusing on the costs associated with one form of social regulation, environmental 
quality, a significant body of literature examines the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and 
their later amendments. Becker and Henderson (2000) show how the Clean Air Act altered 
businessesÕ decisions regarding the construction, location, and size of new plants. In response to 
the new regulations, firms were more likely to build smaller plants in low-pollution areas. 
Although firmsÕ decisions complied with environmental legislation, the costs of building 
inefficiently sized plants in suboptimal locations were significant.7 Greenstone (2002) documents 
substantial job losses, reductions in capital investments, and lower outputs as a result of the same 
regulations. Hazilla and Kopp (1990) emphasize the importance of accounting for social costs 
when evaluating the effects of environmental regulations, rather than simply counting private 
expenditures. They highlight the potential for spillover effects outside the industry directly 
affected by the regulations and note that the social costs of regulation likely increase through 
time.8 
                                                
6 For example, if regulatory compliance raises fixed costs, larger producers would benefit over smaller rivals by 
spreading said costs over larger volumes of output. Likewise, if newer and more efficient producers are better able 
to comply with new directives, they may push for tougher standards to squeeze the operators of older facilities who 
would be forced to make significant investments to stay in business. Regardless, the result is larger market shares 
and less competition for the advantaged producers. 
7 For related research detailing the effects for specific industries, see Becker and Henderson (2001). Additionally, 
Becker (2003) examines how local community attributes predict the level of investment in pollution abatement. 
8 They estimate that while the Clean Air and Water acts created the largest burden for the energy sector, every 
production sector experienced some rise in costs, many through secondary effects. The insurance and finance 
sectors, for example, do not bear direct cost increases from environmental regulations. However, production costs in 
even these sectors rise as a result of increased factor prices. 
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An additional consequence of federal regulations is their potential regressive effects. 
While a substantial body of literature addresses the regressive effects of taxation,9 only a few 
studies explore the distributional consequences of regulation. The early literature focuses on the 
regressive effects of environmental quality regulations. The earliest of these papers, Dorfman 
and Snow (1975), estimates the incidence of costs for the US environmental protection program 
(as it existed in 1973), for the years 1972, 1976 and 1980. They find that the compliance costs 
were mildly regressive in 1972, but grew in regressive intensity as time elapsed. Gianessi et al. 
(1979) show that while the federal Clean Air Act of 1970Õs standards applied nationwide, neither 
the costs nor the benefits of improved air quality pollution were distributed evenly. The 
incidence of compliance costs were highly regressive, with households in the poorest income 
group spending on average 8.2% of their annual income compared to 1.8% for the highest 
income group. However, overall benefits were progressive, with the lowest income decile 
receiving benefits equal to 8% of household income, compared to 1.3% for the highest income 
group. On balance, the net benefits (i.e., benefits minus direct costs) of compliance were mixed. 
With respect to automobile emission standards, net benefits of compliance were universally 
negative and regressive, ranging from -3.1% of household income for the poorest group and 
increasing to -0.4% for the highest income group. The overall net benefits of all air quality 
regulations were highest for the poorest income group (-0.2% of income), but were mildly 
regressive for the remaining income groups Ð i.e., households in the next poorest income decile 
received net benefits of -0.9% of income, with this estimated figure gradually rising to -0.5% for 
the highest income decile. The following year, Gianessi et al. (1980) explore the distributional 
impact of Clean Water Act of 1972 regulations on US families, and finds that lower income 
                                                
9 See Poterba (1991) for an analysis of gasoline taxes, Wier et al. (2005) for an analysis of carbon dioxide taxes, and 
Borren and Sutton (1992) for an examination of cigarette taxes. 
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families bore a disproportionate burden of the short-run compliance costs. Finally, Robison 
(1985) estimates the industrial pollution abatement cost burden faced by a wide array of income 
groups in 1973 and 1977. In both years, abatement costs were estimated to be highly regressive. 
Recently, researchers have studied the regressivity of a broader array of regulations. For 
example, Crain and Crain (2010) analyze the effects of regulations on businesses and find that 
small firms bear disproportionate shares of compliance costs. Thomas (2012) argues that many 
health and safety regulations are regressive because they often target risks that reflect the 
preferences of high-income households. Relative to their low-income counterparts, high-income 
households have stronger preferences for reducing low-probability risks that are costly to 
mitigate. When these risks are addressed by regulations, all market participants (regardless of 
income) bear the costÑin the form of higher prices for consumers and lower wages for workers. 
Thomas contends that regulatory costs are disproportionately borne by low-income households, 
inasmuch as they are obliged to pay for higher levels of care for human health and safety than 
they would in the absence of regulation. In addition, these costs potentially crowd out private 
risk-reduction spending by low-income households. 
Miller (2012) allows for the possibility of distributional effects in her analysis of the 
federal energy conservation regulation for new residential dishwashers. The Department of 
Energy, which issued the new regulation in 2012,10 estimated that it would raise dishwasher 
prices by 13%. Interestingly, Miller reports that the breakeven point for a consumer to recover 
a higher dishwasher price from energy savings is 11.8 years of operation, which is longer than 
(or near the end of) the average 9-to-12-year useful life of a new residential dishwasher. Miller 
                                                
10 Department of Energy, Direct Final Rule: Energy Conservation Standards for Residential Dishwashers, RIN No. 
1904-AC64, May 30, 2012, https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/05/30/2012-12340/energy-conservation 
-program-energy-conservation-standards-for-residential-dishwashers#h-12. 
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calculates that the breakeven point for senior adults and low-income households exceeds 13 
years, suggesting that these consumers are harmed even more than other households by the 
energy efficiency regulation. 
While studies such as MillerÕs examine the effects of specific regulations on prices in 
particular industries, no study to date offers a comprehensive analysis of the impact of 
regulations on consumer prices in general. This paper contributes to the literature by estimating 
empirically the relationship between regulatory growth and consumer prices, as well as by 
examining the extent to which regulations are regressive. We begin by constructing a simple 
theoretical framework to demonstrate the relationship between regulations and price changes and 
to show how regulations might affect consumers of varying income levels differently. We then 
match quintile-based basket weights and prices for over 60 consumer expenditure categories 
from the BLS with regulatory restrictions from the RegData database. Using the matched panel 
dataset, we estimate the regressive impact of federal regulations on consumer prices. Care is 
taken to ensure that our results are properly identified and robust to differences in model 
specification and estimation methodology. 
3. Theoretical framework 
Before we begin our empirical analysis, we present a simple theoretical model to illustrate how 
we envisage regulation affecting prices and consumersÕ spending patterns. Consider an economy 
with  consumers who are distinguished by their incomes. Consumer i spends part of her 
income on a regulated commodity, , with the remainder of her income spent on other 
(unregulated) commodities. The demand function for the regulated commodity is , 
2n ³
i
x
( , )
i i
x p m
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where p is the price of the regulated commodity and  is consumer iÕs money income. The 
demand for all goods is assumed to be decreasing in price and increasing in income.11 
The regulated commodity is produced by a firm with the supply function , which 
is increasing in price and decreasing in the level of regulation R, the latter relation owing (for 
example) to regulation raising the cost of production. Equilibrium requires that 
 !" #,%" = !(#, ()" . (1) 
That is, aggregate consumer demand for the regulated commodity must equal the quantity 
supplied by the firm. 
From the above framework we obtain the following predictions (see Appendix A for the 
mathematical details): 
Prediction 1: If demand for the regulated commodity with respect to income is inelastic, then 
lower-income consumers spend larger shares of their incomes on the regulated commodity than 
do higher-income consumers. 
Commodities that are considered to be necessities or essential in nature (e.g., utilities, 
food, healthcare) tend to be subject to more regulation than other types of commodities. As the 
demand for necessities tends to be both price and income inelastic, it follows that lower-income 
consumers will spend relatively more of their incomes on the regulated commodity. 
Prediction 2: More regulation increases the price of the regulated commodity. 
The intuition behind Prediction 2 is simple: more regulation reduces the supply of the 
regulated commodity (by raising production cost), ceteris paribus; thus, its price must rise to 
clear the market. 
                                                
11 We place no restrictions on the precise form of the demand function, though for simplicity we assume that it 
generates constant own-price and income elasticities. 
i
m
( , )x p R
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Prediction 3: If demand for the regulated commodity with respect to both income and price is 
inelastic, then an increase in regulation causes lower-income consumers to reduce their 
spending on other commodities by proportionally more than it does for higher-income 
consumers. 
 The intuition for Prediction 3 follows that for Predictions 1 and 2. Lower-income 
consumers spend proportionately more of their incomes on the regulated commodity, and more 
regulation increases its price. As the most heavily regulated commodities tend to be necessities, 
and necessities tend to be both income and price inelastic, an increase in price hurts lower-
income consumers more in the sense that their spending on other commodities must fall by a 
greater proportion. 
Regulation provides some well-known and clear-cut benefits, such as ensuring that 
commodities satisfy certain quality standards and are safe for consumption. But as the above 
analysis suggests, regulation also can have adverse effects falling disproportionately on lower-
income consumers. It is these effects that we explore in our empirical work.  
4. Differences in spending patterns across income groups 
We begin our analysis by evaluating Prediction 1 of our theoretical model, which posits that low- 
and high-income households differ in their spending habits. In particular, low-income 
households should spend larger percentages of their income on more heavily regulated goods and 
services relative to high-income households, if the demand for these goods is inelastic. To 
examine this prediction empirically, we combine two data sources: household expenditure and 
pricing data by good/service category from the BLS and industry-specific data on regulatory 
restrictions from the RegData database. 
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4.1 Household expenditure data 
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) is based on quarterly interview surveys, conducted by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, of approximately 7,000 US households. It is constructed as a 
rotating panel, in which each household is interviewed once every three months for five quarters 
and then is dropped from the survey. The survey contains information related to household 
income levels and demographic characteristics, as well as detailed data that describe household 
expenditures. 
The CE dataset is organized by the Universal Classification Codes (UCC) system, which 
consists of six-digit codes that categorize goods and services into specific purchase groups. 
Households are queried about the details of their monthly spending habits. Each purchase is 
recorded and labeled with an appropriate UCC. The CE also collects income data for each 
household, enabling the examination of expenditure habits by income level. Using this micro 
dataset, the BLS constructs expenditure share tables by pretax income quintiles for 
approximately 70 broad categories (known as item strata), which vary in number and 
composition by year.12  Because of this variation in coverage, we limit our focus to the 61 
expenditure categories that span the full sample period, excluding any non-consumption 
household spending (e.g., charitable contributions, life insurance payments, and retirement 
contributions). 
The BLS also publishes Òstub filesÓ, which are mappings describing how the underlying 
UCC-coded expenditures are aggregated from the micro CE data to form the annual expenditure 
                                                
12 Data available at http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxshare.htm. Given the minor variation in categories by year, we select 
those categories with consistent coverage over the sample period. 
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categories described above.13  This mapping ultimately enables us to aggregate UCC-matched 
regulations onto the smaller set of 61 annual expenditure categories (described in greater detail 
below). The BLS also publishes comprehensive Consumer Price Index (CPI) values for each of 
the corresponding aggregate expenditure categories described above, which easily facilitates the 
matching of expenditure shares and prices.14 
4.2 RegData 
While regulations can be used to refer to the guidelines published in the Code of Federal 
Regulations, it is important for our empirical work that we define the term precisely. Our 
regulation measures come from RegData, the Mercatus CenterÕs database of industry-specific 
federal regulations. RegData is unique in its method of measuring regulatory burdens. It analyzes 
rules and guidelines published in the Code of Federal Regulations, but instead of reporting page 
counts or numbers of rules, it counts each specific binding restriction that appears in the texts of 
regulatory policies. Each time a policy includes a word indicating an obligation, such as must or 
shall, that word is counted as a restriction.15 These restrictions are weighted by their industry 
relevance and summed to produce a regulatory index value.16 Regulatory index values are 
reported by industry and by year, so it is possible to track regulatory restrictions within a 
particular industry over time. All our empirical calculations and estimates of ÒregulationsÓ refer 
to this regulatory index from RegData. 
                                                
13 We use the 2010 Diary stub file (Dstub) to map UCC codes onto the aggregate categories. Documentation 
pertaining to the CES and the stub files are available at 
http://www.bls.gov/cex/pumd/documentation/documentation14.zip. For missing or sparsely covered expenditure 
categories, we included additional, related UCC mappings. 
14 For each year, we use the year-end annual price averages from the December ÒCPI Detailed ReportÓ, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpi_dr.htm. 
15 Five words are coded as restrictions in RegData: shall, must, may not, prohibited, and required. 
16 For details on the methodology of calculating measures of regulation, see www.regdata.org/methodology. 
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RegData reports regulations by two-, three- and four-digit codes of the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS). To combine this information with the expenditure and 
consumer price data from the BLS, we link NAICS codes to UCCs using commodity input-
output tables from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Consumer Expenditure/Personal 
Consumption Expenditure Concordance from the BLS.17 
We have approximately 350 unique UCCs for each year. To create broader spending 
categoriesÑand to facilitate an eventual examination of the effect of regulation on pricesÑwe 
collapse UCCs into the aggregate expenditure categories used by the BLS. Using the BLSÕs CE 
aggregation scheme, we match the underlying UCC codes from the BLSÕs consistent 61 
expenditure categories with our regulation dataset indexed by UCC code. Our combined dataset 
(793 observations) includes data for five income quintiles, spanning the 2000Ð2012 period. 
Furthermore, our measures of regulatory burden include both direct regulations, which capture 
restrictions affecting a good or service itself, and input regulations, which capture restrictions 
affecting the supply chain of inputs for a particular good or service (see Appendix B for details). 
The variable total regulations is the sum of direct and input regulations. 
4.3 Consumer expenditure patterns 
Table 1 shows the percentage of spending for each income quintile in categories with very high 
and very low levels of regulation. These numbers represent average values for each income 
quintile spanning the 2000Ð2012 period. Households in the highest-income quintile spend 54.5% 
of their incomes in the 25 most heavily regulated expenditure categories, where regulations for 
goods and services are measured directly (excluding input regulations). The corresponding 
                                                
17 For a detailed description of the methodology mapping regulations from the NAICS space onto goods and 
services in the UCC space, see Appendix B. 
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number for the lowest-income households is 60.2%, which is 10% more than high-income 
households. Including all regulations, the difference is about 12%. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
An opposite pattern is evident when comparing expenditures in the least regulated 
expenditure categories. The highest-income group allocates 32.19% of its total spending to goods 
and services subject to the fewest direct regulations, while the bottom-income quintile spends 
25.64% of its total expenditures in the same category. Total regulations reflect the same patterns, 
with high-income households spending more (38.6%) in lightly regulated areas than low-income 
households (31.9%). 
Table 2 presents the expenditure categories for which the difference in expenditure 
allocations between the bottom- and top-income quintiles is greatest.18 These are areas in 
which the lowest-income families allocate larger shares of their overall spending than do 
higher-income families. These categories contain rent and utilities, including electricity, 
telephone services, and audio and visual equipment and services. Households from the lowest-
income quintile spend more than five-and-a-half times as much on rented dwellings than 
households from the highest-income quintile, as a percentage of total expenditures.19 They 
spend almost 85% more on electricity as a percentage of total expenditures and 50% more on 
telephone service. Other categories in which the poorest households spend larger proportions 
                                                
18 For a complete list of the top-20 expenditure categories and their corresponding direct and total regulation ranks 
for each of the five income quintiles, see Appendix B. 
19 Note that spending for each quintile is reported as a percentage of overall total expenditures for each income 
group. The level of total spending in most categories is greatest for households in the top quintile. 
 17 
of their incomes are drugs and medical supplies, medical insurance and miscellaneous food 
items. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
To explore the regulatory restrictions that apply to these categories, Figure 1 plots annual 
direct regulations for each of these expenditure categories from 2000 to 2012.20 For most 
categories, a general upward trend in regulations is evident over the sample period. Exceptions 
are the cigarette industry, which has experienced a downward trend (at least until recently), and 
the category that includes medical services and insurance, which experienced a sharp initial drop 
in regulations, followed by a steep increase. The category containing rented dwellings also 
experienced a recent spike in regulations, following earlier variations across time. Most of the 
expenditure categories that capture basic utilities show substantial growth in regulations: direct 
regulations for electricity, telephone service, and audio and visual equipment and services all 
increased by 33% to 37%. Regulations in the gasoline industry grew by 33%. The largest 
increase occurred in the drugs and medical supplies category, which experienced an almost 90% 
rise in direct regulations. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Taken together, these data support the argument that important differences exist in 
consumer spending patterns by income groups. We find that, relative to the wealthiest 
                                                
20 RegData contains no direct federal restrictions for the nonalcoholic beverages expenditure category, so we include 
no corresponding graph of changes in regulation for this category. 
 18 
households, the poorest households spend larger percentages of their incomes on goods and 
services that are more heavily regulated and smaller percentages of their incomes on goods that 
are less regulated. Particularly large differences are evident in spending patterns for utilities, 
including natural gas, electricity, and cable or satellite television service. The regulatory burden 
on these industries has increased sharply over time. In most cases, the increases have outpaced 
the overall average growth rate of all regulations. 
5. Calculating price changes by income group 
Given the established differences in spending habits across income groups, we seek to determine 
whether growth in regulations has a disproportionately negative effect on low-income 
households in the form of higher prices for goods and services, which comprise a large share of 
their expenditures. To explore these potential regressive regulatory effects, we employ the 
detailed Consumer Price Index data for each expenditure category. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
 Table 3 contains the names of each expenditure category, the average basket weight by 
income group, and the direct, input, and total regulations for each expenditure category. We also 
use the expenditure basket weights to construct annual aggregate weighted regulation series for 
each income group: 
 (*+,
- = .",
- ∙ (*+"," , (2) 
where .",
-  are expenditure basket weights equal to the proportion of spending in year 0 on 
expenditure category 1 by households in quintile ℎ (ℎ	 = 	1, 2, …	 , 5), and (*+", are the regulations 
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that apply to expenditure category 1 in year 0. Table 4 reports the weighted regulations that apply 
to the full all-households group. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
By combining the basket weights and price data, we construct two alternative price 
indexes for each income group. The first is a classic Laspeyres price index, whereby for each 
income group (ℎ), fixed basket weights from the base year (2000), denoted by .",8999
- , are 
multiplied by their corresponding current-year category prices (:",) and summed over the 
expenditure categories (indexed by 1) to derive the following index: 
 :,
-,;<=>?@A?=
= .",8999
- ∙ :","  (3) 
The widely used Laspeyres price index suffers from a number of well-known problems, 
most notably substitution bias. To overcome this shortcoming, we calculate the following 
chained price index: 
 :,
-,B-<"C?D = :,EF
-,B-<"C?D×
HIJ
HIJKL
MIJ
N OMIJKL
N
P
" . (4) 
Table 5 reports the aggregate price indexes for both of the foregoing methodologies. 
Interestingly, regardless of the index used, the rate of price increases is highest for the poorest 
households, declining as incomes rise. This finding is consistent with Kaplan and Schulhofer-
Wohl (2016), who use the 50,000 household Kitts-Nielsen Consumer Panel (KNCP) dataset and 
discover that low-income households (on average) experience higher inflation rates. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
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6. The effect of regulations on consumer prices 
6.1 GMM estimation results 
Figure 2 provides a scatter plot of the weighted total regulations for each of the five income groups 
against their corresponding group-specific chained price series. Clearly, a strong positive 
correlation exists between total regulatory burden and total prices. That said, both prices and 
regulations trended upward over the sample period (2000Ð2012), so it is important explicitly to 
control for this common trend to rule out any spurious correlation. To do this, we compare the 
growth rate of prices over time against the growth rate of regulations.21 To ensure that the 
regulation-consumer price results are properly identified, and robust to the inclusion of 
alternative control variables, we insert lagged regulation growth into a standard Phillips curve 
model (see Stock and Watson 2008): 
 #,
- = Q- + ST*+,EF
- + U#,EF
- + A L X, + Y,
-, (5) 
where #,
- is the log first difference of the chained price series for household ℎ, Q- are unique 
intercepts for each income group, T*+,EF
-  is the logged first difference of the total regulations 
series for household ℎ lagged one year, X, includes the national unemployment rate and output 
gap, and the lag operator A(L) returns the contemporaneous and one-period lagged values of X,; 
Y,
- is a mean zero error term.22  To ensure that the results are robust and that inclusion of a one-
period lag (0 − 1) of prior regulatory growth is appropriate, we perform a lag-selection exercise 
that includes every combination of the following three variables and are added to a simple first-
order autoregressive model of price increases: current regulatory growth (0), a one-period lag 
                                                
21 In practice, we transform the price and regulation data by taking their natural logarithm and first differencing each 
series. This calculation effectively yields the growth rate of each series. 
22 The annual civilian unemployment rate and the annual real gross domestic product (billions of chained 2009 
dollars) are from the St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED Database (https://fred.stlouisfed.org). Using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter ([ = 6.25), real output is split into a trend and cyclical component. The cycle is then normalized by 
the trend component and expressed as a percentage, thus yielding the output gap. 
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(0 − 1) of regulatory growth, and a two-period lag (0 − 2) of regulatory growth.23 Both the 
Akaike and the Schwarz criteria are minimized when only a one-period lag of regulation growth 
(T*+,EF
- ) is entered. This result supports our earlier theory of a natural gestation period between 
the publication of new regulatory restrictions and their measurable impact on prices. After the 
impacted production processes have been altered to comply with new regulatory dictates, an 
associated jump in the price of these goods and services is found. Moving forward, these 
regulations do not promote additional price hikes as their effect already has been captured in the 
change in the price level of the affected goods and services, suggesting that longer lags of 
regulatory growth should not have statistically significant effects on the current growth rate of 
prices. 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
Figure 3, which plots the average price increases for all households, reveals a sharp 
deflationary drop in 2008, with the series falling from about 4% in 2007 to nearly -1% in 2008. 
This clear structural break in the price index (and hence negative spike in the growth rate) likely 
introduces downward bias in the estimated AR(1) coefficient on price increases. Therefore, a 
dummy variable for 2008 to correct the break introduced by the Great Recession is also added to 
Equation (5). 
 Equation (5) is a dynamic fixed-effect panel model. Unfortunately, standard fixed effects 
methods that utilize a within transformation (or random effects methods) yield biased coefficient 
                                                
23 The lagged selection model is a simple AR(1) time series framework with common intercept term: #,
- = Q +
S(^)T*+,
- + U#,EF
- + Y,
-. Without exception, current regulatory growth and the two-period lag of regulatory growth 
are statistically insignificant in every variant in which they appear. 
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estimates in such models. Therefore, we first utilize Arellano and BondÕs (1991) generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator, which was specifically developed to estimate dynamic 
fixed-effect panel models. A brief sketch of this estimation procedure will follow; those 
interested in a fuller exposition should see Arellano and Bond. To begin, Equation (5) is first-
differenced to eliminate the income-group fixed effects. Next, a suitable instrument set is 
constructed, consisting of lagged predetermined endogenous variables expressed in levels (i.e., 
#,E8
- , #,E_
- , #,E`
- ) and the exogenous variables expressed in first differences (i.e., ΔT*+,EF
- ).24  For 
the Arellano and Bond estimator to yield consistent and efficient estimates, the modelÕs errors 
cannot be autocorrelated; that is, b Y,
-Y=
- = 0 for d ≠ 0. Following Arellano and Bond, we use 
the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, which tests the validity of moment restrictions 
implied by the instruments. Under the null hypothesis that the moment restrictions are valid 
(which implies the absence of second- or higher-order autocorrelation), the test statistic is 
asymptotically chi-square distributed. 
 Estimation results for Equation (5) are provided in Table 6. Because Lanne and Luoto 
(2014) find the most common control variables (i.e., laborÕs share of total income, the output gap, 
and the unemployment rate) are not empirical drivers of US inflation, as a preliminary baseline we 
first estimate Equation (5) without the unemployment rate and output gap (see column (1)). The 
coefficient on lagged regulatory growth is statistically significant, equaling 0.0687 and implying 
that a 10% increase in total regulations is associated with a rise in consumer prices by an 
additional 0.687%.25  Furthermore, the Sargan test statistic for Equation (5) is equal to 4.95 with 
                                                
24 Arellano and Bond (1991) specify the use of all predetermined lagged endogenous variables, whereas we follow 
the common practice of using less than the full set of lagged variables (i.e., we use periods t − 2, t − 3, and t − 4 
inflation rates, but not period t − 5 or before). We did experiment with larger instrument sets that included more 
lags, but the results (not reported in this paper but available on request) were nearly identical. 
25 We use White (period) robust standard errors throughout unless otherwise specified. 
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an associated p value of 0.18. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid. Therefore, the n-step GMM estimation results reported 
below are both consistent and efficient.26 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 Column (2) of Table 6 reports the results for the preferred specification of Equation (5), 
which includes the full set of control variables. The coefficient on lagged regulatory growth is 
statistically significant and nearly double the initial estimate reported in column (1), equaling 
0.1258. This result implies that a 10% increase in total regulations increases consumer prices by 
a hefty 1.258%. The coefficient on lagged price growth is negative and statistically significant, 
consistent with the dampened oscillations depicted in Figure 3. The coefficients on 
unemployment are contradictory, as one would expect higher unemployment to reduce 
inflationary pressure (i.e., both coefficients should be negative). The coefficient on lagged 
unemployment is negative and statistically significant (-0.0093) but is nearly exactly offset by 
the positive coefficient on current unemployment (0.0097). Likewise, the coefficient on the 
current output gap is positive as one would expect (0.0177), but is partially offset by the negative 
coefficient on the lagged output gap (-0.0093). Not surprisingly, the Great Recession dummy 
variable is negative and statistically significant (-0.0249). Although these results are somewhat 
unexpected, it is important to stress that the output gap and unemployment are included to help 
appropriately identify the impact of regulations on consumer prices. Furthermore, the estimated 
                                                
26 The original Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator involves two steps, whereby an initial consistent estimate of the 
dynamic panel yields residuals that are used to construct a GMM weighting matrix, that is, used to more efficiently 
re-estimate the dynamic panel. Our software package, Eviews, iteratively repeats this process, each time updating 
the GMM weighting matrix until convergence is achieved. The result is a more efficient estimator than that 
proposed by Arellano and Bond. If the weighting matrix is not invertible, the 1-step matrix is used instead. 
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impact of past regulations on current price increases is not materially altered by the inclusion or 
exclusion of these additional covariates. 
 
6.2 Granger causality 
To ensure that our results are properly identified, we address the possibility of endogeneity 
between regulations and price changes. Specifically, can increases in prior consumer prices lead 
to an increase in federal regulations?  At the local level, examples exist of municipalities 
enacting ordinances in order to influence prices (e.g., rent control), and most states have public 
utility commissions that regulate the prices of telephone service and electricity, but there is little 
evidence that this is occurring at the federal level over the sample period (2000 to 2012). Richard 
Nixon was responsible for the last imposition of wage and price controls in 1971. Since that 
time, the trend at the federal level has been toward deregulating interstate service providers and 
allowing market forces to determine prices (e.g., the elimination of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in 1995, which previously regulated rates for rail and truck freight, and the 
dissolution of the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1985, which had previously regulated interstate 
airfares). According to RegData, the top ten regulators in 2012 were the: 1) Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), 2) Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 3) Coast Guard, 4) Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 5) Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 6) 
Agricultural Marketing Service (USDA-AMS), 7) Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 8) 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 9) Department of Defense (DoD), and 10) Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).27 Given the missions of the above regulators, one can 
reasonably conclude that the bulk of the new regulations created by these agencies are related to 
                                                
27 Source: RegData (http://regdata.org/how-the-top-ten-regulators-of-2012-changed-over-ten-years/). 
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environmental quality, taxes/accounting standards, maritime safety/commerce, workplace safety, 
broadcast/communication rules, food, drug, and medical device safety, aviation safety, the 
military, and electric power generation. Nonetheless, we conduct a Granger causality test under 
the null hypothesis that higher consumer prices do not Granger-cause new regulations. The test 
fails to reject the null at any standard level of significance, verifying that prior price increases do 
not Granger-cause subsequent regulations.28 
 
6.3 Cross-section FGLS estimation results 
Given that household income groups consume the same goods and services (albeit with differing 
budget shares), price shocks to any expenditure category will have similar, contemporaneous 
effects on household-specific price increases. As such, contemporaneous correlation exists in the 
errors across household groups (i.e., b(Y,
"Y,
f
) ≠ 0 for all 1, g ∈ ℎ). Combining this with the fact 
that the time dimension of our sample exceeds that of the cross-sectional observations (T > N), 
we can improve the estimation efficiency of Equation (5) using a cross-sectional Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) weighting matrix similar to that suggested in Zellner (1962). 
To obtain the weighting matrix, we first estimate equation-by-equation OLS specifications of 
Equation (5), deriving separate (and consistent) Phillips curve estimates for each household.29  
The residuals from each equation (Y") are then stacked to form an i×j matrix Y ≡
                                                
28 The unrestricted model is similar to Equation (5), wherein the current growth rate of regulations is regressed on a 
constant, a lag of itself, current and one-period lags of both unemployment and the GDP gap, and one- and two- 
period lags of the inflation rate. The restricted model sets the coefficients on the lagged inflation terms equal to zero. 
The resulting F-stat equals 0.077, which is not significant at any standard level of significance. 
29 As noted by Nickell (1981), all dynamic models with relatively short time dimensions, including autoregressive 
time series and dynamic panel models, suffer from ÒHurwicz type bias,Ó regardless of the estimation procedure used. 
That said, our estimation procedure is biased but consistent. 
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(YF, Y8, … , Y-)′, which in turn is used to construct an i×i, contemporaneous cross-household 
variance-covariance matrix: 
Σ =
F
n
YYo =
pFF pF8⋯ pFr
p8F
⋮
⋱
⋮
prF ⋯ prr
. 
The corresponding ij×ij variance-covariance for the panel residuals thus is 
Ω = Σ⨂wn =
pFFwn pF8wn⋯ pFrwn
p8Fwn
⋮
⋱
⋮
prFwn ⋯ prrwn
. 
Because most dynamic panels in the literature are assumed to have large N and small T, 
elimination of the fixed effect by within-transformation (i.e., demeaning each cross-section to 
remove the invariant fixed effect parameter) is very desirable as it reduces greatly the number of 
parameters (by N-1). However, as shown by Nickell (1981), doing this in a dynamic panel leads 
to inconsistent OLS estimates holding T fixed and increasing i → ∞. Alternatively, one can first 
difference dynamic panel equations to eliminate the invariant nuisance parameters (fixed 
effects), but this creates a first-order moving average process in the residuals that is correlated 
with the first difference of the lagged dependent variable. To overcome this endogeneity, 
researchers perform GMM estimation using instrumental variables consisting of lagged 
endogenous variables (see, among others, Anderson and Hsiao 1982; Arellano and Bond 1991). 
In our model, the cross-sectional dimension is fixed at five (i.e., the household-income quintiles), 
but the time dimension spans a decade and will continue to grow with new data. Hence, the 
appropriate test of consistency is fixed N and large T→ ∞. In this framework, Equation (5) can 
be estimated consistently as a fixed effects model wherein dummy variables are entered to 
capture household-income quintiles, resulting in only a small loss of degrees of freedom. 
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Efficiency is improved by employing the FGLS weighting matrix (ΩEF) introduced above. 
Estimates of Equation (5) following this procedure are reported in Table 6 (columns 3 to 6). 
For the sake of comparison, column (3) excludes all control variables except lagged price 
increases and regulatory growth. The results are very similar to the GMM results reported in 
column (1). The coefficient on lagged regulatory growth is approximately halved (0.0282), but 
remains positive and statistically significant. The coefficient on lagged price growth declines 
slightly in magnitude from -0.4857 to -0.3585. 
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 6 report the estimation results for variations of Equation (5), 
with fixed effects omitted in column (5), and FGLS weighting foregone in column (6). From 
these results spring three conclusions. First, the estimation results are robust to the estimation 
methodology, as the cross-sectional FGLS and GMM results are nearly identical (especially 
when comparing columns (2) and (6)). Second, FGLS weighting reduces the magnitude of the 
regulation coefficient (compared to column (6), column (4) is 21% smaller and column (5) 
declines by 27%). Finally, the inclusion or omission of the fixed effects do not systematically 
affect the coefficient on regulations (comparing columns (4) and (5)). The overall average 
coefficient on lagged regulations reported in Table 6 equals 0.0890, while the median equals 
0.0938. This strongly suggests that a 10% increase in regulations increases consumer prices by 
just under 1% (i.e., between 0.890% and 0.938%). 
 
6.3 Robustness: Growth dynamics of the underlying goods and services 
Our results strongly support the assertion that regulatory restrictions promote higher prices 
across the socioeconomic spectrum, as measured by changes in the cost of baskets of goods and 
services purchased by various income groups. To ensure that this result is not driven by the 
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basket weights themselves, we eliminate them completely and investigate the relationship 
between regulatory growth and price changes for each expenditure category (e.g., bakery 
products, major appliances, menÕs apparel). Specifically, we estimate the following dynamic 
panel model, which does not employ any household expenditure weights: 
 #", = Q" + ST*+",EF + U#",EF + Y",, (6) 
where #", is the log first difference of the original price series for expenditure category 1 (1 =
1, …	, 61), Q" is the unique intercept for each expenditure category, T*+",EF is the log first 
difference of the regulations that apply to expenditure category 1 in the prior year, and Y", is a 
mean zero error term.30 Essentially, Equations (5) and (6) are very similar except that we are 
modeling the price increases for individual expenditure categories rather than the broader rate of 
inflation over a basket of goods, and we are excluding the aggregate macroeconomic control 
variables (i.e., the unemployment rate and the output gap). The unique intercepts accommodate 
different long-run rates of price growth by category type. Because the number of expenditure 
categories (N=61) exceeds the time dimension (T=10), we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
GMM estimator. The results are reported in Table 7. While smaller in magnitude, the coefficient 
on lagged regulatory growth is statistically significant, equaling 0.0360. Although statistically 
significant, the inclusion of a 2008 Great Recession dummy variable makes almost no difference 
in the coefficient estimate on regulatory growth (see column 2), increasing it to 0.0369. These 
results imply that a 10% increase in total category-specific regulatory restrictions increases the 
price of goods and services in that category by an additional 0.36%. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
                                                
30 See Table 3 for a list of the detailed expenditure categories. 
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7. Conclusion 
A significant and often hidden cost of regulation is its effect on consumer prices. As with taxes, 
the burden of regulatory costs is likely to be passed along, at least in part, to consumers in the 
form of higher prices. While the literature explores other specific costs of regulation, noting that 
higher consumer prices are a probable consequence of heavy regulation, this study is the first to 
provide a thorough empirical analysis of that relationship across industries. Our dataset, which 
combines information from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, RegData, and price changes from 
the Consumer Price Index, allows us to determine the effects of regulations on prices and to ask 
whether those effects are regressive. 
We document consumer spending patterns by income group and find that the lowest-
income households spend a larger fraction of their income in areas that are more heavily 
regulated. The opposite is true of the wealthiest households: they allocate more of their spending 
to goods and services that are subject to fewer regulations. Our estimates of the effect of 
regulatory growth on price levels suggest a positive, robust, and statistically significant 
relationship. A 10% increase in regulations is associated with just under a 1% increase in prices. 
This effect is particularly concerning for low-income households, which face larger regulatory-
induced price increases than high-income households. 
It is important to emphasize that these results do not include state or municipal 
regulations. If state and local regulations have qualitatively similar impacts on consumer prices, 
the regressive regulatory impact of all regulations on poor households is even greater than what 
our results suggest.  
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Appendix A. Proofs of predictions from theoretical model 
Proof of Prediction 1 
Consumer iÕs spending on the regulated commodity as a share of her income is: 
     (A1) 
Therefore: 
    (A2) 
   (A3) 
where  is the income elasticity of demand. Therefore, if demand with respect to income is 
inelastic, i.e., , then . ■ 
Proof of Prediction 2 
Application of the Implicit Function Theorem to equation (1) yields: 
     (A4) 
which shows that p is increasing in R. ■ 
Proof of Prediction 3 
Consumer iÕs budget constraint is: 
     (A5) 
where  denotes consumer iÕs expenditure on all commodities other than . Dividing the 
budget constraint by  yields: 
     (A6) 
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and differentiating with respect to R yields: 
   (A7) 
Recall that  (Prediction 2). Equation (A7) can be simplified to: 
     (A8) 
where  is the regulated commodityÕs price elasticity of demand. The left-hand side of equation 
(A8) shows the proportional change in consumer iÕs spending on other commodities when p 
increases. Recall that  is decreasing in  if demand with respect to income is inelastic 
(Prediction 1). Therefore, if demand with respect to price is also inelastic, i.e., , then 
an increase in p causes lower-income consumers to reduce their spending on other commodities 
by proportionately more than it does for higher-income consumers. ■ 
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Appendix B. Methodological description of the construction of the consumer expenditure 
survey and regulation datasets 
To determine the disparate effects of government regulations on households in different 
socioeconomic strata, we construct a dataset that maps goods and services from the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CE) onto industry regulations from the Mercatus Center at George Mason 
UniversityÕs industry regulation database (RegData). 
The CE provides detailed household spending and price data for a wide array of goods 
and services by income group. These goods and services are organized using the Universal 
Classification Codes (UCC) system. RegData 2.0, however, reports the level of industry 
regulation by the two-, three-, and four-digit North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) code for each year between 1997 and 2012. Therefore, to construct a usable database, 
we map regulations from the NAICS space onto goods and services in the UCC space. The 
resulting balanced panel dataset contains 9,872 observations, covering 617 UCC-based goods 
and services over a 16-year period. 
To construct the final dataset, the following steps are employed: 
1.! The RegData 2.0 dataset consists of two-digit, three-digit, and four-digit NAICS-based 
tables. Each regulation record in the tables contains the name of the government agency 
imposing the regulation, the year of the regulation, the industry affected by the 
regulation, the regulatory word count, the restriction count, and the industry regulation 
index value. For our purposes, we use the industry regulation index value, which equals 
the regulatory restriction count weighted by industry relevance.31 
                                                
31 For a description of the methodology used to construct RegData, see http://regdata.org/methodology. 
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For each industry-and-year pair, the industry regulation index values are summed 
across federal regulators. Therefore, for each industry-and-year combination, a single-
industry regulation index value is derived, equaling the sum of all regulatory restrictions 
(weighted by industry relevance) imposed on that industry by all federal regulators for 
that year. The result is three aggregated datasets, one for each two-digit, three-digit, and 
four-digit NAICS-based table. Last, the three aggregated datasets are combined (stacked) 
to form a single dataset. 
2.! The spreadsheet containing the 2007 commodity-by-industry direct requirements (after 
redefinitions) table was downloaded from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
website (http://www.bea.gov/industry/xls/io-annual/CxI_DR_2007_detail.xlsx). This 
spreadsheet contains two work sheets, both of which are used below: 
a.! The first work sheet is a concordance that converts the BEAÕs input-output (I-O) 
commodity/industry codes into 2007 NAICS codes. 
b.! The second work sheet is the I-O direct requirements table, which contains I-O 
weights (Q"f) equal to the amount of input (measured in dollars) from industry 
(1) required to produce a dollarÕs worth of output by industry (g). By 
construction, these weights sum to 1 because, in addition to actual inputs, the 
BEA includes employee compensation, taxes, and gross operating surplus in the 
weighting schema. 
3.! The I-O commodity/industry code to NAICS concordance described in step (2a) above 
is matched with the aggregate industry regulations from step (1), to create a new table 
that lists the aggregate industry regulations by I-O commodity/industry code; the 
resulting table is further summed over commodity code by year to derive a table with a 
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single total regulation value for each commodity codeÐyear pair. This second round of 
aggregation after the initial match is necessary because some commodity codes map 
onto multiple NAICS industries. I-O commodity/industry codes with no associated 
regulations are assigned an industry regulation index value of 0. The resulting table is a 
measure of the direct regulations (denoted z1T*{0(*+",) applicable to a given I-O 
commodity/industry code. 
4.! To determine the level of regulation that applies to the inputs/supply chain of a given 
industry, the I-O direct requirements (Q"f) from step (2b) are matched with the direct 
regulations for each I-O commodity (z1T*{0(*+",) from step (3) by way of their I-O 
commodity/industry codes. Note that if a commodity/industry is not needed to produce a 
given output, the associated input value is 0. This produces a large result set with more 
than 2.4 million rows of data. This dataset is then Ògrouped byÓ output industry (g) and 
year (0) and summed over the product of the direct input regulations (indexed by i) and I-
O weights, producing an estimate of inputÐsupply chain regulation: 
w|#Y0(*+f, = Q"f ∙ z1T*{0(*+"," . 
See Figure B1 for a graphical summary of steps (1) to (4). 
 
[Figure B1 here] 
 
5.! The direct regulations by industry and year are matched with the total input regulations 
by industry and year. The direct and input regulations are summed to determine the total 
direct and indirect regulations affecting a given industry: 
j}0~(*+", = z1T*{0(*+", + w|#Y0(*+",. 
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6.! To map regulations onto the UCC codes, a separate set of queries is executed to map the 
codes onto I-O commodity/industry codes. 
a.! As a beginning step, we import the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) 
concordance from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (http://www.bls.gov/cex 
/pce_concordance_2012.xlsx). This file maps UCC codes onto PCE codes from 
the BEAÕs national income and product accounts (NIPAs). 
b.! Next, we import BEA table 2.4.5U (I-O, Personal Consumption Expenditures by 
Type of Product with 2007 Input-Output Commodity Composition). This latter 
bridge file (http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/2007-pcs-io-bridge.xls) maps NIPA 
line numbers onto PCE codes. 
c.! The tables from steps (6a) and (6b) are matched by way of their common PCE 
codes. The resulting table serves as a bridge file that maps UCC codes onto NIPA 
line numbers. 
7.! Finally, we import the BEAÕs PCE bridge file, which maps NIPA line numbers onto I-O 
commodity/industry codes (www.bea.gov/industry/xls/io-annual/PCEBridge_2007 
_Detail.xlsx), along with the total value of all purchases of the linked I-O 
commodity/industry in 2007. 
a.! Matching the NIPA line items from the PCE bridge with the results from step (6c) 
provides a clear mapping from UCC code to I-O commodity/industry codes. See 
Figure B2 for a graphic summary of steps (6) and (7). 
 
[Figure B2 here] 
 37 
8.! The resulting table from step (7a) maps a given consumer product from the CE onto all I-
O industries that produce that product. In many cases, more than one industry produces a 
given UCC product. To produce a single regulation value for each consumer product, we 
derive industry weights equal to a given industryÕs 2007 level of output relative to the 
total output of all industries that supply a given UCC product.32 For example, the UCC 
code for flour is 10110. This consumer product is produced by seven I-O industries. 
Assigning each of these industries a weight equal to its total output relative to the total 
output of all seven industries produces a set of weights that sum to 1 (see table B1). 
Although it would be preferable to update these weights annually, the BLS derives these 
output data from the US Census BureauÕs Economic Census, which is conducted only 
every five years. 
 
[Table B1 here] 
 
9.! Finally, UCC codes, I-O commodity/industry codes, and output shares from step (8) are 
matched with the regulation-by-industry data from step (5). These matched data are then 
Ògrouped byÓ UCC code and year and aggregated over the product of industry regulation 
and output shares. 
  
                                                
32 Consumption-based weights equal to each industryÕs market share for a given commodity would be preferable to 
weights based on the overall relative size of the industries that produce said commodity. Unfortunately, to our 
knowledge, no such data exist. 
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Appendix C. Top 20 expenditure categories by income quintile and corresponding 
regulations 
Income Quintile 1 (Bottom 20%)           
Expenditure Category Expenditure 
Direct Reg 
Rank 
Direct  
Regs 
Total Reg 
Rank 
Total 
Regs 
Rented dwellings 14.67% 15 14,741 25 26,084 
Owned dwellings 8.55% 7 84,121 8 135,787 
Medical services and insurance 5.80% 4 166,222 7 262,865 
Food away from home 5.47% 37 473 45 16,430 
Gasoline and motor oil 4.66% 5 161,726 3 428,323 
Electricity 4.19% 26 1,725 9 92,603 
Cars and trucks, used 3.55% 55 0 61 0 
Telephone services 3.25% 9 33,094 14 47,054 
Education 3.12% 24 1,917 52 14,599 
Audio and visual equipment and services 2.37% 22 3,877 58 13,272 
Vehicle insurance 2.23% 2 306,785 1 477,185 
Drugs and medical supplies 2.07% 33 826 44 16,580 
Cars and trucks, new 2.05% 44 101 60 6,412 
Miscellaneous foods 1.86% 53 2 31 20,640 
Miscellaneous 1.80% 8 34,464 11 54,266 
Household operations 1.67% 46 70 59 6,613 
Housekeeping supplies 1.64% 20 9,331 20 32,149 
Maintenance and repairs 1.62% 16 13,006 26 24,941 
Small appliances, misc. housewares, and household equip. 1.58% 36 593 37 17,557 
WomenÕs apparel, age 16 and over 1.51% 30 1,236 43 17,276 
            
Income Quintile 2            
Expenditure Category Expenditure 
Direct Reg 
Rank 
Direct  
Regs 
Total Reg 
Rank 
Total 
Regs 
Rented dwellings 11.38% 15 14,741 25 26,084 
Owned dwellings 10.24% 7 84,121 8 135,787 
Medical services and insurance 6.60% 4 166,222 7 262,865 
Food away from home 5.61% 37 473 45 16,430 
Gasoline and motor oil 5.33% 5 161,726 3 428,323 
Cars and trucks, used 4.47% 55 0 61 0 
Electricity 3.86% 26 1,725 9 92,603 
Telephone services 3.18% 9 33,094 14 47,054 
Cars and trucks, new 2.72% 44 101 60 6,412 
Vehicle insurance 2.65% 2 306,785 1 477,185 
Audio and visual equipment and services 2.34% 22 3,877 58 13,272 
Drugs and medical supplies 2.18% 33 826 44 16,580 
Miscellaneous 1.99% 8 34,464 11 54,266 
Maintenance and repairs 1.84% 16 13,006 26 24,941 
Household operations 1.81% 46 70 59 6,613 
Small appliances, misc. housewares, and household equip. 1.72% 36 593 37 17,557 
Miscellaneous foods 1.68% 53 2 31 20,640 
Housekeeping supplies 1.63% 20 9,331 20 32,149 
Personal care products and services 1.48% 35 613 57 13,342 
WomenÕs apparel, age 16 and over 1.37% 30 1,236 43 17,276 
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Income Quintile 3           
Expenditure Category Expenditure 
Direct Reg 
Rank 
Direct  
Regs 
Total Reg  
Rank 
Total  
Regs 
Owned dwellings 12.75% 7 84,121 8 135,787 
Rented dwellings 8.47% 15 14,741 25 26,084 
Food away from home 6.20% 37 473 45 16,430 
Medical services and insurance 6.09% 4 166,222 7 262,865 
Gasoline and motor oil 5.58% 5 161,726 3 428,323 
Cars and trucks, used 4.59% 55 0 61 0 
Cars and trucks, new 3.64% 44 101 60 6,412 
Electricity 3.39% 26 1,725 9 92,603 
Telephone services 3.04% 9 33,094 14 47,054 
Vehicle insurance 2.75% 2 306,785 1 477,185 
Audio and visual equipment and services 2.31% 22 3,877 58 13,272 
Miscellaneous 2.04% 8 34,464 11 54,266 
Small appliances, misc. housewares, and household equip. 1.95% 36 593 37 17,557 
Maintenance and repairs 1.90% 16 13,006 26 24,941 
Household operations 1.81% 46 70 59 6,613 
Drugs and medical supplies 1.71% 33 826 44 16,580 
Miscellaneous foods 1.60% 53 2 31 20,640 
Housekeeping supplies 1.51% 20 9,331 20 32,149 
Personal care products and services 1.45% 35 613 57 13,342 
WomenÕs apparel, age 16 and over 1.43% 30 1,236 43 17,276 
            
Income Quintile 4           
Expenditure Category Expenditure 
Direct Reg 
Rank 
Direct 
Regs 
Total Reg 
Rank 
Total 
Regs 
Owned dwellings 15.50% 7 84,121 8 135,787 
Food away from home 6.70% 37 473 45 16,430 
Medical services and insurance 5.52% 4 166,222 7 262,865 
Gasoline and motor oil 5.29% 5 161,726 3 428,323 
Rented dwellings 4.99% 15 14,741 25 26,084 
Cars and trucks, used 4.59% 55 0 61 0 
Cars and trucks, new 4.41% 44 101 60 6,412 
Electricity 2.88% 26 1,725 9 92,603 
Telephone services 2.74% 9 33,094 14 47,054 
Vehicle insurance 2.61% 2 306,785 1 477,185 
Audio and visual equipment and services 2.22% 22 3,877 58 13,272 
Small appliances, misc. housewares, and household equip. 2.15% 36 593 37 17,557 
Household operations 2.06% 46 70 59 6,613 
Miscellaneous 2.04% 8 34,464 11 54,266 
Maintenance and repairs 1.90% 16 13,006 26 24,941 
Education 1.71% 24 1,917 52 14,599 
Housekeeping supplies 1.61% 20 9,331 20 32,149 
Miscellaneous foods 1.54% 53 2 31 20,640 
WomenÕs apparel, age 16 and over 1.51% 30 1,236 43 17,276 
Personal care products and services 1.47% 35 613 57 13,342 
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Income Quintile 5           
Expenditure Category Expenditure 
Direct Reg 
Rank 
Direct  
Regs 
Total Reg 
Rank 
Total  
Regs 
Owned dwellings 18.55% 7 84,121 8 135,787 
Food away from home 6.90% 37 473 45 16,430 
Cars and trucks, new 5.29% 44 101 60 6,412 
Medical services and insurance 4.60% 4 166,222 7 262,865 
Gasoline and motor oil 4.21% 5 161,726 3 428,323 
Cars and trucks, used 3.33% 55 0 61 0 
Education 3.30% 24 1,917 52 14,599 
Household operations 2.91% 46 70 59 6,613 
Small appliances, misc. housewares, and household equip. 2.48% 36 593 37 17,557 
Electricity 2.27% 26 1,725 9 92,603 
Other lodging 2.27% 21 5,352 24 26,406 
Rented dwellings 2.17% 15 14,741 25 26,084 
Fees and admissions 2.15% 55 0 21 29,019 
Telephone services 2.14% 9 33,094 14 47,054 
Vehicle insurance 2.11% 2 306,785 1 477,185 
Miscellaneous 2.05% 8 34,464 11 54,266 
Audio and visual equipment and services 1.95% 22 3,877 58 13,272 
Maintenance and repairs 1.79% 16 13,006 26 24,941 
WomenÕs apparel, age 16 and over 1.66% 30 1,236 43 17,276 
Public transportation 1.64% 1 382,599 2 435,932 
Note: Regulations are measured by way of industry regulation index value; see Appendix B for details. 
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Table 1. Average percentage of total expenditure on regulated categories by income quintiles from 2000Ð2012 
  Bottom 20% Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Top 20% 
% Difference 
(Bottom vs. 
Top Quintile) 
25 Most-Regulated Expenditure Categories 
 
          
Direct Regulations 60.15% 58.42% 57.22% 57.22% 54.51% 10.35% 
Total Regulations 58.73% 58.13% 56.64% 54.31% 52.23% 12.44% 
              
25 Least-Regulated Expenditure Categories 
 
          
Direct Regulations 25.64% 27.28% 28.99% 30.97% 32.19% -20.35% 
Total Regulations 31.88% 32.22% 33.92% 36.07% 38.63% -17.47% 
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Table 2. Expenditure categories with largest differences in spending between bottom and top income quintiles, 
2000Ð2012 
Expenditure Category Bottom Quintile Top Quintile  Difference % Difference 
Rented dwellings 14.67% 2.17% 12.50% 576.04% 
Electricity 4.19% 2.27% 1.92% 84.58% 
Medical services and insurance 5.80% 4.60% 1.20% 26.09% 
Telephone services 3.25% 2.14% 1.11% 51.87% 
Tobacco products and smoking supplies 1.41% 0.41% 1.00% 243.90% 
Drugs and medical supplies 2.07% 1.13% 0.94% 83.19% 
Miscellaneous foods 1.86% 1.26% 0.60% 47.62% 
Gasoline and motor oil 4.66% 4.21% 0.45% 10.69% 
Nonalcoholic beverages 1.04% 0.62% 0.42% 67.74% 
Audio and visual equipment and services 2.37% 1.95% 0.42% 21.54% 
Note: Values represent the percentage of expenditures each income quintile allocates to specific expenditure categories. 
 
  
 47 
Table 3. Average basket shares and regulations by income quintile 
  Average Basket Weights (2000 to 2012) Average Regulations 
Expenditure Category Bottom 20% 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile Top 20% Direct Input Total 
Alcoholic beverages 0.98% 0.96% 1.06% 1.13% 1.20% 1,000 18,139 19,140 
Audio and visual equipment and services 2.37% 2.34% 2.31% 2.22% 1.95% 3,877 9,396 13,272 
Bakery products 1.05% 0.96% 0.87% 0.81% 0.67% 411 15,695 16,106 
Beef 0.76% 0.74% 0.65% 0.59% 0.48% 11,219 30,471 41,691 
Boys' apparel, ages 2 to 15 0.23% 0.23% 0.23% 0.23% 0.24% 1,255 16,200 17,456 
Cars and trucks, new 2.05% 2.72% 3.64% 4.41% 5.29% 101 6,311 6,412 
Cars and trucks, used 3.55% 4.47% 4.59% 4.59% 3.33% 0 0 0 
Cereals and cereal products 0.56% 0.49% 0.44% 0.39% 0.33% 180 22,418 22,597 
Children's apparel, under age 2 0.26% 0.24% 0.23% 0.23% 0.18% 620 14,451 15,071 
Drugs and medical supplies 2.07% 2.18% 1.71% 1.40% 1.13% 826 15,754 16,580 
Education 3.12% 1.29% 1.31% 1.71% 3.30% 1,917 12,682 14,599 
Eggs 0.18% 0.11% 0.11% 0.12% 0.10% 21,764 25,261 47,025 
Electricity 4.19% 3.86% 3.39% 2.88% 2.27% 1,725 90,877 92,603 
Fats and oils 0.34% 0.31% 0.24% 0.23% 0.16% 8 21,970 21,978 
Fees and admissions 0.79% 0.81% 1.04% 1.35% 2.15% 0 29,019 29,019 
Fish and seafood 0.38% 0.35% 0.31% 0.29% 0.25% 235,349 147,703 383,052 
Floor coverings 0.06% 0.08% 0.09% 0.10% 0.14% 0 14,270 14,270 
Food away from home 5.47% 5.61% 6.20% 6.70% 6.90% 473 15,957 16,430 
Food prepared by consumer unit on out-
of-town trips 
0.10% 0.11% 0.11% 0.12% 0.12% 473 15,957 16,430 
Footwear 0.99% 0.88% 0.84% 0.79% 0.76% 1,790 25,395 27,184 
Fresh fruits 0.64% 0.60% 0.53% 0.49% 0.43% 2 17,568 17,569 
Fresh milk and cream 0.53% 0.48% 0.40% 0.35% 0.25% 24 27,026 27,050 
Fresh vegetables 0.62% 0.59% 0.51% 0.47% 0.41% 1 14,492 14,493 
Fuel oil and other fuels 0.41% 0.39% 0.33% 0.32% 0.28% 116,284 251,824 368,108 
Furniture 0.72% 0.75% 0.85% 0.95% 1.35% 17 17,310 17,327 
Gasoline and motor oil 4.66% 5.33% 5.58% 5.29% 4.21% 161,726 266,598 428,323 
Girls' apparel, ages 2 to 15 0.25% 0.29% 0.30% 0.31% 0.33% 1,236 16,040 17,276 
Household operations 1.67% 1.81% 1.81% 2.06% 2.91% 70 6,543 6,613 
Household textiles 0.25% 0.30% 0.32% 0.33% 0.37% 71 15,403 15,475 
Housekeeping supplies 1.64% 1.63% 1.51% 1.61% 1.42% 9,331 22,819 32,149 
Maintenance and repairs 1.62% 1.84% 1.90% 1.90% 1.79% 13,006 11,935 24,941 
Major appliances 0.42% 0.47% 0.51% 0.55% 0.59% 217 13,578 13,796 
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Table 3. Continued 
  Average Basket Weights (2000 to 2012) Average Regulations 
Expenditure Category Bottom 20% 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile Top 20% Direct Input Total 
Medical services and insurance 5.80% 6.60% 6.09% 5.52% 4.60% 166,222 96,644 262,865 
MenÕs apparel, age 16 and over 0.69% 0.71% 0.78% 0.86% 1.00% 1,255 16,200 17,456 
Miscellaneous 1.80% 1.99% 2.04% 2.04% 2.05% 34,464 19,803 54,266 
Miscellaneous foods 1.86% 1.68% 1.60% 1.54% 1.26% 2 20,638 20,640 
Natural gas 1.30% 1.29% 1.14% 1.03% 0.91% 18,733 259,424 278,157 
Nonalcoholic beverages 1.04% 0.95% 0.86% 0.80% 0.62% 0 17,400 17,400 
Other apparel products and services 0.59% 0.55% 0.54% 0.54% 0.86% 110 16,175 16,286 
Other dairy products 0.69% 0.65% 0.62% 0.59% 0.51% 19 24,429 24,448 
Other entertainment supplies, equipment, 
and services 
0.57% 0.81% 0.90% 1.23% 1.44% 3,533 17,021 20,554 
Other lodging 0.89% 0.76% 0.89% 1.17% 2.27% 5,352 21,054 26,406 
Other meats 0.36% 0.34% 0.31% 0.25% 0.25% 20,967 30,794 51,761 
Other vehicles and vehicle finance charges 0.45% 0.71% 1.03% 1.24% 0.99% 0 14,706 14,706 
Owned dwellings 8.55% 10.24% 12.75% 15.50% 18.55% 84,121 51,666 135,787 
Personal care products and services 1.46% 1.48% 1.45% 1.47% 1.48% 613 12,729 13,342 
Pets, toys, hobbies, and playground 
equipment 
0.96% 1.27% 1.25% 1.29% 1.31% 868 19,231 20,099 
Pork 0.62% 0.55% 0.48% 0.40% 0.30% 12,844 30,525 43,369 
Poultry 0.53% 0.47% 0.40% 0.38% 0.29% 11,219 39,140 50,359 
Processed fruits and vegetables 0.73% 0.67% 0.55% 0.51% 0.42% 0 22,501 22,501 
Public transportation 0.88% 0.85% 0.92% 1.03% 1.64% 382,599 53,333 435,932 
Reading 0.30% 0.29% 0.29% 0.31% 0.33% 432 14,104 14,536 
Rented dwellings 14.67% 11.38% 8.47% 4.99% 2.17% 14,741 11,343 26,084 
Small appliances, misc. housewares, and 
household equip. 
1.58% 1.72% 1.95% 2.15% 2.48% 593 16,964 17,557 
Sugar and other sweets 0.41% 0.38% 0.34% 0.34% 0.27% 21 19,472 19,493 
Telephone services 3.25% 3.18% 3.04% 2.74% 2.14% 33,094 13,961 47,054 
Tobacco products and smoking supplies 1.41% 1.24% 1.10% 0.83% 0.41% 29,159 6,696 35,854 
Vehicle insurance 2.23% 2.65% 2.75% 2.61% 2.11% 306,785 170,400 477,185 
Vehicle rentals, leases, licenses, and other 
charges 
0.75% 0.84% 1.01% 1.20% 1.53% 0 34,902 34,902 
Water and other public services 1.16% 1.17% 1.09% 1.03% 0.84% 27,845 62,090 89,935 
WomenÕs apparel, age 16 and over 1.51% 1.37% 1.43% 1.51% 1.66% 1,236 16,040 17,276 
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Table 4. Combined household weighted regulations, all households 
  Direct Input Total 
Year Regulations Regulations Regulations 
2000 42,283 41,608 83,890 
2001 43,454 42,697 86,151 
2002 42,998 42,661 85,659 
2003 43,578 43,651 87,228 
2004 45,786 46,266 92,051 
2005 44,926 46,868 91,793 
2006 46,056 47,990 94,046 
2007 47,627 49,188 96,815 
2008 50,214 53,343 103,556 
2009 47,575 48,833 96,409 
2010 50,569 51,759 102,328 
2011 52,399 55,618 108,017 
2012 54,523 57,570 112,092 
Note: Regulations are measured by way of industry regulation index value; see 
Appendix B for details. 
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Table 5. Laspeyres and chained price indexes 
Laspeyres             
Year 
All 
Households 
Bottom 
20% 
2nd 
Quantile 
3rd 
Quantile 
4th 
Quantile 
Top  
20% 
2000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 
2001 101.114 101.388 101.216 101.149 100.999 101.117 
2002 103.395 103.832 103.568 103.449 103.180 103.234 
2003 104.800 105.473 105.125 104.847 104.420 104.523 
2004 108.431 109.297 108.923 108.517 108.019 107.828 
2005 112.241 113.488 112.967 112.342 111.663 111.272 
2006 115.064 116.487 115.776 115.141 114.357 114.032 
2007 120.292 122.091 121.307 120.522 119.504 118.740 
2008 119.927 122.360 121.272 120.115 118.848 118.631 
2009 124.303 126.703 125.765 124.819 123.432 122.479 
2010 126.459 129.117 128.177 127.099 125.570 124.288 
2011 130.628 133.545 132.644 131.392 129.711 128.136 
2012 132.976 135.989 135.048 133.772 132.003 130.391 
Inflation Rate 2.40% 2.59% 2.54% 2.45% 2.34% 2.24% 
              
Chained             
Year 
All 
Households 
Bottom 
20% 
2nd 
Quantile 
3rd 
Quantile 
4th 
Quantile 
Top  
20% 
2000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 
2001 100.937 101.201 101.008 100.880 100.821 100.955 
2002 103.225 103.595 103.403 103.186 103.028 103.077 
2003 104.479 105.248 104.827 104.350 104.001 104.257 
2004 108.019 108.995 108.553 108.063 107.524 107.474 
2005 111.638 113.126 112.483 111.865 111.083 110.777 
2006 114.326 116.119 115.251 114.560 113.731 113.377 
2007 119.122 121.388 120.529 119.649 118.631 117.646 
2008 118.218 121.336 119.509 118.279 117.283 117.105 
2009 122.411 125.388 124.097 122.958 121.777 120.834 
2010 124.121 127.319 126.048 124.829 123.548 122.313 
2011 127.872 131.422 130.034 128.741 127.312 125.842 
2012 130.085 133.850 132.318 130.983 129.460 127.977 
Inflation Rate 2.22% 2.46% 2.36% 2.27% 2.17% 2.08% 
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Table 6. Inflation and regulation growth regression results 
  GMM   Cross-Section FGLS 
Coefficient (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regulation growth (t-1) 0.0687*** 0.1258***   0.0282*** 0.0976*** 0.0900*** 0.1235*** 
  (0.0148) (0.0095)   (0.01) (0.0135) (0.023) (0.0193) 
  
 
    
 
      
Inflation (t-1) -0.4857*** -0.8097***   -0.3585** -0.8384*** -0.3110** -0.8059*** 
  (0.0397) (0.035)   (0.1343) (0.0678) (0.1292) (0.0915) 
                
Unemployment (t)   0.0097***     0.0086*** 0.0124*** 0.0096*** 
    (0.0013)     (0.0011) (0.0036) (0.0015) 
                
Unemployment (t-1)   -0.0093***     -0.0083*** -0.0077** -0.0092*** 
    (0.0013)     (0.0011) (0.0037) (0.0015) 
                
Output Gap (t)   0.0177***     0.0164*** 0.0156*** 0.0176*** 
    (0.0014)     (0.0014) (0.0042) (0.0018) 
                
Output Gap (t-1)   -0.0093***     -0.0081*** -0.0025 -0.0092*** 
    (0.0011)     (0.0013) (0.0036) (0.0017) 
                
2008 time dummy   -0.0249***     -0.0234*** -0.0474*** -0.0250*** 
    (0.0021)     (0.0023) (0.0087) (0.0033) 
                
Observations 50 50   55 55 55 55 
Sargan test 4.95 35.07   --- --- --- --- 
Sargan p-value 0.18 0.11   --- --- --- --- 
                
Fixed Effects? --- ---   Yes Yes No Yes 
FGLS Weighting --- ---   Yes Yes Yes No 
Goodness of Fit --- ---   0.643 0.945 0.649 0.955 
Note:                
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels denoted *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
For GMM estimation results, White robust (period) standard errors in parenthesis. GMM instruments consist of 
predetermined endogenous variables in levels lagged between two and four periods, while the remaining exogenous 
variables (i.e., regulation growth, unemployment, and the output gap) are first differenced and serve as their own 
instruments (the one exception being the 2008 period dummy, which enters the instrument set in level). In both 
columns (1) and (2), Sargan test fails to reject null hypothesis that overidentifying restrictions are valid at any 
standard level of significance. Sargan test not applicable to Cross-Sectional FGLS results.  
 
For cross-sectional FGLS results, ordinary standard errors are reported (the use of cross-sectional weights renders 
White robust (period) standard errors inappropriate in this model specification). Models not employing FGLS 
weighting (i.e., column (6)) report cross-sectional SURE PCSE standard errors. 
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Table 7. Expenditure category inflation and regulation growth regression results 
Coefficient (1) (2) 
Lagged regulation growth 0.0360*** 0.0369*** 
  (0.0089) (0.0093) 
      
Lagged inflation -0.1998*** -0.1969*** 
  (0.0031) (0.0027) 
      
2008 time dummy   -0.0088*** 
    (0.0017) 
      
Observations 610 610 
Sargan test 47.36 50.28 
Sargan p-value 0.17 0.11 
Note: White robust (period) standard errors in parenthesis 
*** denotes 1% significance     
Sargan test fails to reject null hypothesis that overidentifying restrictions are 
valid at any standard level of significance 
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Table B1. Input-Output industries that produce flour (UCC: 10110) 
Commodity 
Code Commodity/Industry Description 
Purchase 
Value 
Output 
Share, % 
311230 Breakfast cereal manufacturing 12,889 34.7 
31122A Soybean and other oilseed processing 114 0.3 
3118A0 Cookie, cracker, pasta, and tortilla manufacturing 16,255 43.8 
311210 Flour milling and malt manufacturing 4,659 12.5 
311990 All other food manufacturing 660 1.8 
1111B0 Grain farming 618 1.7 
311420 Fruit and vegetable canning, pickling, and drying 1,939 5.2 
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Figure 1. Changes in direct regulations across time (2000Ð2012) for selected expenditure categories 
 
Note: Direct regulations, measured on the y-axes, are measured by way of industry regulation index value; see Appendix B for more details. 
Numbers after chart titles represent the overall percentage growth from 2000 to 2012. 
Figure 2. Total regulations versus chained prices 
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Figure 3. All-household average rate of inflation 
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Figure B1. Mapping regulations onto input-output (I-O) codes 
 
Aggregated RegData    NAICS Codes Concordance 
Source: Mercatus Center   Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Appendix B step (1)    Appendix B step (2a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I-O Commodity-by-Industry   Regulations by I-O Code 
Direct Requirements Table    Source: Combine steps (1) and (2a) above 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis  Appendix B step (3) 
Appendix B step (2b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Direct Regulations by I-O Code 
Source: Combine steps (2b) and (3) above 
Appendix B step (4) 
 
 
 
 
Note: NAICS = North American Industry Classification System.  
  
NAICS code 
Total regulation index 
NAICS code 
I-O commodity/industry code 
 
I-O commodity/industry code 
Total regulation index (DirectRegit) 
I-O commodity/industry code 
I-O direct requirement coefficient (aij) 
I-O commodity/industry code 
InputRegjt = S (aij ! DirectRegit) 
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Figure B2. Mapping input-output (I-O) codes onto consumer expenditure codes 
 
PCE Concordance    I-O, Personal Consumption 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics   Expenditures by Type of Product 
Appendix B step (6a)    Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
      Appendix B step (6b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PCE Bridge      UCC Code by NIPA Line Number 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis  Source: Combine steps (6a) and (6b) above 
Appendix B step (7)     Appendix B step (6c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UCC Code by I-O Code 
Source: Combine steps (6c) and (7) above 
Appendix B step (7a) 
 
 
 
 
Note: PCE = personal consumption expenditures; UCC = Universal Classification Codes; NIPA = national income 
and products accounts. 
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